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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF TUITION AND STUDENT LOAN POLICIES ON COLLEGE
OUTCOMES AND LIFETIME EARNINGS
Junwen Liu
Hanming Fang
To increase college access and reduce the burden of student loan debt, the US gov-
ernment has developed several new tuition and student loan policies. These include the
newly proposed free community college plan and the recently enacted Pay As You Earn
plan that makes student loan repayments contingent on earnings. I develop and estimate
a dynamic life-cycle model of the decisions individuals make with regard to schooling,
work, savings and student loan borrowing. The model is estimated with micro-level US
data and is used to evaluate the effects of these educational policies on education out-
comes, lifetime earnings and welfare. My results show that the free community college
plan benefits individuals from lower-income families the most, increasing their commu-
nity college enrollment rate by 17 percentage points from 41 percent to 58 percent.
However, it reduces the population proportion of individuals who achieve a bachelor’s
degree by 9 percent. The Pay As You Earn plan reduces labor supply in college, lowers
the time it takes to complete a bachelor’s degree, and enables individuals to attend
higher-quality colleges. The overall education level is improved with the percent of in-
dividuals holding a bachelor’s degree increasing from 31 to 33 percent. I also evaluate
the effects of a hypothetical loan forgiveness plan for college dropouts, which is found
to increase college enrollment but reduce college completion. Of the three policies, the
Pay As You Earn plan achieves the highest welfare gain and reduces lifetime earnings
inequality.
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1 Introduction
How can the government increase college access and reduce the student loan debt bur-
den? This question has become a major focus of US educational policy for a couple of
reasons. First, the total outstanding student loan debt in the US quadrupled between
2004 and 2015, increasing from 263 billion dollars in 2004 to 1.19 trillion dollars in 2015
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Q2,2015)). Second, despite existing need-based
student grant and loan programs, there remains a wide college attainment gap with re-
spect to family income levels. In 2013, 77 percent of individuals from the highest family
income quartile obtained a bachelor’s degree by age 24 but only 9 percent of those from
the bottom family income quartile did the same (Cahalan and Perna (2015)). Moreover,
among individuals who enroll in college, students from lower-income families are more
likely to attend colleges with a quality level that is below what their SAT score qualifies
them for (Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009), Smith, Pender, and Howell (2013)).
To tackle these problems, the Obama administration has developed many initiatives,
such as the recently proposed free community college plan that would make two years
of community college education free for all students. To improve federal student loan
offerings, the government has implemented a new repayment plan called Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) in 2012.1
These policies are expected to be costly, and the outcomes are not immediately avail-
able for assessment. However, it is possible to evaluate the effects of these policies ex
ante using a behavioral model. In this paper, I develop and estimate a dynamic life-
1The PAYE plan has three new features. First, it caps the repayment amount at 10% of annual
income. Second, it extends the maximum repayment time from 10 years to 20 years. Third, it forgives
the loan balance after 20 years of repayment. I discuss this reform in more details below.
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cycle model of the decisions that individuals make with regard to college choice, years
of schooling, work, savings and student loan borrowing. I use the estimated model to
answer two questions. First, how effective are the new tuition and student loan policies
in improving college outcomes and lifetime earnings? Second, what are the fiscal costs
of the policies and are the policies welfare-improving after accounting for fiscal costs?
The existing literature studying credit constraints has mainly focused on an individ-
ual’s binary choice of whether or not to attend college when quantifying the effect of
credit constraints. However, the effect of credit constraints extends beyond this margin.
This paper builds in two additional channels through which a lack of financial resources
can affect college outcomes. First, colleges in my model are heterogeneous in qualities
and costs. Specifically, I allow for five types of colleges: community colleges and four
types of four-year colleges, each distinguished by a particular quality of education.2
Having different college quality levels captures the trade-off between college quality and
cost. As the quality level of a college may influence the chance of college completion
and labor market returns, it is crucial to understand the extent to which an individual’s
financial concerns influence his college quality choice. Second, I model the schooling
accumulation process during college. In particular, working while attending college may
affect an individual’s rate of progression in college, which can result in a lower com-
pletion rate or a longer time to complete a degree. Since the labor income a student
earns during college and his student loan debt are two major financial resources apart
from family transfers and other financial aids, it is important to consider the interaction
between working in college and college outcomes when we assess the impact of student
2Following a similar approach as Black, Smith, and Daniel (2005), I construct the quality index
using two measures: average SAT score and average faculty salary. Based on this index, I categorize
four-year colleges into four quality levels.
2
loan policies.
To evaluate the effect of reforms on federal student loan repayment structure, I ex-
plicitly model the federal student loan program. In the model, risk-averse individuals
face uncertainty about both schooling accumulation and labor income. These risks sug-
gest that the student loan debt repayment structure potentially affects their schooling
and subsequent labor supply decisions. Under the standard repayment plan that existed
prior to the 2012 Pay As You Earn plan, individuals are required to repay a fixed amount
of student loan debt regardless of their labor market income. This repayment structure
implies low levels of consumption during periods when individuals suffer bad income
shocks and the expectation of this will affect college choices. The Pay As You Earn plan
makes student loan repayments co-move with income, reducing the risk of low consump-
tion. Individuals in the model are heterogeneous in family income and SAT scores. I
also allow for unobserved permanent heterogeneity in risk aversion, in preferences for
schooling and labor supply, in admissions and schooling accumulation probabilities, in
family transfers, and in the initial human capital. Explicitly accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity allows for potential selection on unobservables into schooling types.
I estimate the model using two micro-level data sets: the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS). The NLSY97 surveys a nationally representative sample. It contains rich
information about college choices, employment, asset, and student loan debt, and from
this I identify model parameters. IPEDS is a school-level data set that includes a range
of information on US colleges, such as institutional characteristics, admissions and test
scores, and student charges. My estimation, carried out using simulated method of
3
moments, matches key data moments along various dimensions, including enrollment
patterns in each college type, college outcomes, the labor supply and average wages
series, savings, and student loan debt levels.
My estimation results show that the college completion rate is influenced by both
working while attending school and college quality levels. Working has a negative effect
on completion, whereas attending a higher quality college tends to increase the chance
of completion. I simulate the model to understand how the gap in the college completion
rate across family income quartiles is affected by these two channels. I find that working
while attending school is a key factor that influences college completion for students
from lower family income quartiles. When I turn off the effect of working on schooling
accumulation, there is a larger increase in the completion rate among students from
lower-income families, thus reducing the college completion gap across family income
levels. When there is no effect of college quality on schooling accumulation, college
completion is on average lower for students in all family income quartiles. There is a
larger reduction in the completion rate among students from lower-income families than
there is for those from richer families.
With the estimated model, I conduct three policy experiments. First, I study the
impact of the proposed free community college plan by simulating the model with zero
tuition for community colleges. Second, I evaluate the newly implemented Pay As You
Earn repayment plan. Third, I study a hypothetical loan forgiveness program for college
dropouts. This plan is motivated by the low college completion rate, and the sizable
student loan debt college dropouts have on average upon exiting college.
I find that under the free community college plan, community college enrollment
4
increases significantly among individuals from lower-income families. For individuals
whose family income is below the median, the community college enrollment rate in-
creases by 17.30 percentage points from 41.00% to 58.30%. The associate degree comple-
tion rate also rises considerably. The fraction of individuals in the population who have
an associate degree increases from 9.20% to 16.35%. However, the plan has a negative
effect on both the four-year college enrollment and completion rate: there is a 9.00%
reduction, from 31.10% to 28.30%, in the fraction of individuals who attain a bachelor’s
degree. The gap in lifetime earnings between the 50th and 10th percentile is reduced,
indicating a decrease in earnings inequality among lower-earning individuals.
The Pay As You Earn plan increases the rate of enrollment in both the community and
four-year colleges primarily for individuals from lower-income families. The plan also
enables students to attend higher quality colleges. For students whose family income is
lower than the median, the fraction of students enrolled in the top two college quality
levels goes up by 2.40%, from 41.30% to 42.30%. Under this plan, more students take
out student loan debt, yet they spend less time working in college. The average years
worked by four-year college graduation falls by 5.60%, from 2.33 years to 2.20 years.
Among students enrolled in four-year colleges, the college completion rate increases
from 70.79% to 72.00%. At the same time, the time it takes to receive a bachelor’s
degree declines slightly. The overall education level in the population improves as the
fraction of individuals who have a bachelor’s degree increases from 31.10% to 32.78%.
The ratio between the 90th and 50th percentile of the lifetime earnings is lower, which
suggests there is a reduction in earnings inequality in the upper half of the distribution.
The loan forgiveness plan for college dropouts encourages college enrollment, and the
5
most significant increase occurs among individuals from lower-income families. However,
the plan discourages students from completing the degree. The fraction of individuals
who earn an associate degree falls by 28.30%, from 9.20% to 6.60%, while the fraction
who earn a bachelor’s degree falls by 8.68%, from 31.10% to 28.40%. The reduction in
the number of individuals who hold a college degree reduces average lifetime earnings.
In terms of fiscal costs, the Pay As You Earn plan costs the least while the loan
forgiveness plan is the most expensive. All three polices are welfare-improving for a
utilitarian government that maintains a neutral budget.3 The Pay As You Earn plan
leads to the highest welfare gain, and the free community college plan ranks second
among the three policies. The Pay As You Earn plan produces the largest improvement
in the quality of the college attended and in the four-year college completion rate. The
free community college plan is the most effective in terms of improving college outcomes
for lower-income students. The two policies are complementary.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 describes the data and summarizes the results from statistical analysis applied to the
data. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 discusses the identification and estimation
strategy for the model. Section 6 provides the estimates of the model parameters and
the model fit. Section 7 presents results from counterfactual experiments using the
estimated model. Section 8 concludes the paper.
3To make welfare comparisons, I adjust the labor tax rate to maintain a neutral government budget
by re-solving the model and simulating it under the new tax rate. To measure welfare I compute the
lump-sum annual transfer to all individuals that would make a utilitarian government indifferent between
the baseline and the new policy. Note that the effects of all polices on college outcomes and lifetime
earnings presented here derive from simulations that do not impose the cost of the policy on individuals.
These results are qualitatively and largely quantitatively unaffected when the costs are imposed through
tax changes.
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2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, there is a large literature
on credit constraints and college enrollment. One important empirical motivation for
research in this area is the well-established positive correlation between family income
and college enrollment found in US data. The general agreement of the papers that
study cohorts born around the 1960s is that credit constraints have little power in
explaining college attendance behaviors in the early 1980s (e.g., Cameron and Heck-
man (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Keane and
Wolpin (2001), Cameron and Taber (2004)). The collection of newer data sets, such as
the NLSY97, which follows a cohort born in the 1980s, has renewed the research inter-
est in credit constraints and college attendance. Belley and Lochner (2007) document
a dramatic increase in the importance of family income for college attendance from the
NLSY79 cohort to the NLSY97 cohort. They argue that today young people are more
borrowing constrained than they were in the early 1980s.4
My paper uses the NLSY97 cohort. Among the recent papers that use this data
set, such as Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b), Johnson (2013), Abbott, Gallipoli,
Meghir, and Violante (2013), my paper is most closely related to Johnson (2013). There
are three main differences. First, Johnson (2013) does not separate student loan debt
from other assets while I distinguish student loan debt from risk-free assets, enabling me
to evaluate reforms to the federal student loan program. Second, I allow for the trade-
off between college quality and cost of four-year colleges, a feature that is not present
in Johnson (2013). Third, I incorporate the effect of working in school on schooling
4See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) for an extensive review of the literature.
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accumulation and I show that it is an important factor for college outcomes.
My study also relates to a growing literature that examines student loan program
design.5 In several papers, Felicia Ionescu (Ionescu (2008, 2009, 2011)) evaluates how
different student loan policies impact college attainment and student loan default. Com-
pared to Ionescu’s framework, my model provides a more detailed characterization of the
college enrollment stage. For example, my model allows colleges to be heterogeneous in
their quality and costs. This enables me to evaluate how student loan policies affect the
lifetime earnings and welfare through the trade-off between quality and cost when an
individual makes college decisions. There are other significant differences as well. Her
model only allows individuals to make college enrollment decisions at the beginning of
life, and all students are enrolled for four years without the option to drop out. Whether
a student becomes a college graduate realizes with certain probabilities at the end of the
fourth year and students are not allowed to enroll for more than four years. In contrast,
in my model individuals decide whether to enroll in college every period sequentially
until a certain age, and they can choose to drop out at any period. This enables the
model to fit the intertemporal enrollment patterns in the data well. Moreover, since
I model the schooling accumulation process, I can assess the impact of student loan
policies on time-to-degree, which also has important implication for lifetime earnings.
Third, my paper contributes to the literature that studies the link between college
quality and labor market returns. Dan Black and Jeffrey Smith (Black and Smith
(2004, 2006), Black, Smith, and Daniel (2005)) document the substantial returns that
come from attending a high quality school after controlling for individual characteristics,
such as ability. Hoekstra (2009) and Kinsler and Pavan (2011) find similar results.
5Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2015) summarizes this literature.
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Scholars continue to debate, however, the issue of whether the higher labor market
returns for graduates from elite colleges can be attributed to self-selection based on
ability, especially unobserved ability, or to institutional characteristics. For example, in
an effort to identify unobserved ability, Dale and Krueger (2002) do not find an earnings
differential when they compare the earnings for students who attended more selective
colleges to those who were accepted and rejected by comparable schools but attended less
selective schools. They conclude that the payoff to attending an elite college is greater
for students from more disadvantaged family backgrounds. My framework explicitly
addresses the selection problem by accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore,
the model estimates can also shed light on the extent to which we can attribute the
higher college returns to elite colleges to institutional features. To my knowledge, my
paper is the first to account for college quality in the context of a structural model.
My model also accounts for the differences between community colleges and four-year
colleges. The former are an important alternative to four-year colleges; they are much
cheaper and they provide a more flexible course schedule that accommodates working
students’ schedules. Most papers do not distinguish between community colleges and
four-year colleges. To my knowledge only two structural papers—Johnson (2013) and
Russo (2011)—make this distinction. Johnson (2013) does not model schooling accumu-
lation or degree completion in community colleges, nor does he evaluate policies targeted
at community colleges. In Russo (2011)’s framework, individuals are risk-neutral and
there is no constraint on consumption or borrowing, which makes it hard to quantify
effects of a tuition subsidy on individuals with different financial resources.
The fourth line of literature to which my paper relates studies college behaviors such as
9
college dropout and working while in school. Several papers recognize college investment
is risky and model the college dropout risk (e.g., Akyol and Athreya (2005), Garriga
and Keightley (2007), Johnson (2013), Hendricks and Leukhina (2014), among others).
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) find that credit constraints can explain part of
the attrition, but they caution that this is not the main impetus for dropout behaviors.
At the same time, many papers incorporate in-school labor supply as an important
component of students’ financial resources. For example, Keane and Wolpin (2001) find
that when borrowing constraints are relaxed, individuals tend to work less in school
and enjoy higher consumption. Similarly, Garriga and Keightley (2007) conclude that
tightening the borrowing limit only has a considerable effect when the option to work is
removed. Many other recent structural papers (e.g., Johnson (2013), Abbott, Gallipoli,
Meghir, and Violante (2013)) also allow for working in school. However, few papers have
examined how working affects college completion.6 As I show in the data section, poor
students work much more in school than less-poor students, and they are more likely to
drop out. Moreover, among those who complete a bachelor’s degree, the time-to-degree
is positively correlated with the amount of labor supply during the period when the
student was enrolled in school. My paper incorporates the interaction between in-school
labor supply and college completion, because it is an important channel through which
financial constraints affect college outcomes.
6See Russo (2011), Garriga and Keightley (2007), Joensen and Mattana (2014).
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3 Data
I obtain most of the data used in my analysis from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97). In this data set, a nationally representative sample of individuals
who were born between 1980 and 1984 in the US were interviewed. The process of
data collection started in 1997 and respondents were reinterviewed on an annual basis
thereafter. I use all the waves from 1997 to the most recent one (1997 to 2011). The
data set contains rich information on college choices, employment, asset and student
loan debt, which allows for identification of model parameters. I focus on white males in
the cross-sectional sub-sample who have at least some high school education. I exclude
individuals in the military because military service often results in a very different career
path that I do not aim to capture in my model.
I complement the NLSY97 with the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS). IPEDS contains information on every college in the US, such as institutional
characteristics, admissions, test scores, and student charges, etc. I use this information
to calculate the net cost of attendance for each college enrollee and to construct a college
quality index.
3.1 Main Data Variables
3.1.1 College Quality
Following a similar approach to that employed by Black, Smith, and Daniel (2005), I
use the principal factor of two measures, average SAT score and average faculty salary,
to construct the quality index.7 I categorize four-year colleges into four quality levels
7Both measures are demeaned and normalized by their standard deviation. Black, Smith, and Daniel
(2005) use a third measure for constructing the quality index which is the freshmen retention rate. I do
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based on the college’s quartile in the distribution of the college quality index.
3.1.2 Family Transfers and Family Income
Family income is measured as the total income of both parents from all sources includ-
ing wages and salaries, commissions, tips, business income, pension income, etc. The
NLSY97 collects such information in Round 1 to Round 5 (1997-2001). I use the aver-
age family income over these five years as the family income for each individual in the
model. When I present the descriptive statistics, I categorize the family income into
four quartiles, Quartile 1: less than $43,000, Quartile 2: between $43,000 and $66,400,
Quartile 3: between $66,400 and $98,400, Quartile 4: above $98,400.8 I construct family
transfers using two variables in the data. One is the money parents/other family mem-
bers give to the individual, including any gifts in the form of cash or a check. The other
is the amount of money from parents/other family members to help pay for attendance
in colleges. The NLSY97 has information on family transfers in each survey year.
3.1.3 Net Cost of Attendance
The gross cost of attendance is defined as the sum of the tuition, room and board
expenses and other educational expenses. I use the college identifiers in the NLSY97
and link them to the IPEDS data to calculate the gross cost of attendance for the
college(s) that the individual attended. At the same time, the NLSY97 records the
total financial aids received by an individual in the form of grants, tuition or fee waivers
or reductions, fellowships and scholarships. For each college an individual attended, I
not include this measure because staying in college will be an endogenous choice of individuals in my
model.
8All dollar values in 2006 constant dollars.
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construct the net cost of attendance by subtracting the financial aid from the gross cost
of attendance.
3.1.4 College Application and Admissions
The NLSY97 has college application and admissions records for all individuals in the
sample who were born between 1983 and 1984. It collects information on all the col-
leges to which an individual applied and was admitted. Linking college identifiers in
the NLSY97 to the IPEDS data, I get the name of each of the colleges an individual
applied to and identify the quality level of the college. I then calculate the admissions
probabilities for a college of a given quality level conditional on students’ observable
conditions (family income and SAT score).
3.1.5 College Enrollment and Schooling Accumulation
I use the monthly enrollment records in the NLSY97 to construct the enrollment (or
attendance) status for each period. An individual is assigned to be enrolled in a type of
college in an academic year if he is observed to have enrolled for more than 5 months in
that academic year. If in an academic year an individual is recorded to have attempted
both 4-year college and 2-year college, I assign him to the type of college he is enrolled
in for longer part of that year. To determine whether an individual has completed a
year of schooling, I use the annual records on the highest grade the individual achieved.
Combined with the attendance records, I use these observations to estimate the schooling
accumulation probability in the model.
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3.1.6 Degree Completion and Time to Degree
In the NLSY97 data, an individual reports in each survey year the highest degree com-
pleted and when he attained the degree. Together with the enrollment data, time to
degree is calculated as the number of years between the initial enrollment and the year
the degree is completed. I distinguish an associate degree from a bachelor’s degree as
these two types of degrees have different labor market returns.9
3.1.7 Employment
I categorize the work status into three broad types: nonemployment, part-time and
full-time. I make use of the weekly hours worked records in the NLSY97 to calculate
the total number of hours worked in an academic year. If an individual works less than
500 hours in a given academic year, he is assigned to be nonemployed. If an individual
works in a year between 500 and 1500 hours, he is classified as a part-time worker. A
full-time worker is an individual that supplies labor for more than 1500 hours in an
academic year.
3.1.8 Student Loans and Assets
I follow the definition of assets in Keane and Wolpin (2001). I construct the net asset
value from (i) housing and property values; (ii) savings and checking accounts, money
market funds, retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, life insurance; (iii) farm operation and
business wealth; (iv) student loan debt; (v) other assets and other debt. The NLSY97
collects the asset information when an individual turns 18, 20, 25 and 30 years old.
9In the model students can still attend graduate schools after college but I do not explicitly model
the returns to different types of advanced degrees.
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While the asset questions are not frequently asked, the NLSY97 collects the amount
of student loans a student borrows in every survey year. The survey question asks,
“Other than assistance you received from relatives and friends, how much did you bor-
row in government-subsidized loans or other types of loans while you attended this
school/institution this term?”. Together with the records on school terms, I construct
the total amount of student loans taken out in a given academic year. Unfortunately,
there is no information on repayment available in the data. I assume the repayment
schedule follows a standard repayment scheme as most students use this scheme. I use
the information on remaining student loan debt collected at the same time as the asset
information as a way to check the validity of this assumption.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
There are two broad types of colleges in the US post-secondary education system, 4-
year colleges and 2-year colleges. Figure 1 shows the distribution over no enrollment,
enrollment in 2-year colleges only, enrollment in 4-year colleges only and enrollment
in two types of colleges in accordance with family income quartiles and SAT groups.
A student is classified as having enrolled into both types of college if I observe his
enrollment in 2-year college and 4-year college at any point in the sample period.
Two interesting patterns can be observed in Figure 1. First, the enrollment rate of
4-year colleges goes up as family income increases for all SAT levels. For the lowest SAT
group (SAT≤800), only 13% of those from the poorest family group enrolled in 4-year
colleges while 41% from the highest family income quartile enrolled. This substantial gap
in 4-year college enrollment rates across family income quartiles is slightly reduced for
higher SAT levels but still remains high with a differential of 19% between the highest
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and lowest family income quartile for individuals with SAT>1200. Second, students
from the lower middle income families (Quartile 2) are more likely to transfer between
2-year colleges and 4-year colleges. For example, among those in the second SAT group
(800<SAT≤1200) who once enrolled in 4-year colleges, 32% of students from family
income quartile 2 also went to 2-year colleges while only 20% students in the highest
family income quartile did so. A similar pattern holds for the highest SAT group, with
30% of those in family income quartile 2 transferred between the two types of colleges
and only 10% from the richest group transferred. Overall, there is a declining enrollment
rate into 2-year colleges by family income quartile, although it is not always monotonic.
As 4-year colleges differ a lot in their quality of education, which has different impli-
cation on labor market returns, it is important to understand the enrollment pattern
in 4-year colleges in terms of the college quality. Figure 2 presents a plot of the choice
distribution over no enrollment in 4-year colleges and enrollment in each college quality
quartile for every combination of the family income quartile and the SAT level. An
interesting pattern in this figure is that, for any SAT level, there tends to be more en-
rollment in higher quality when family income is higher. This pattern is particularly
salient for the enrollment in colleges of the highest quality level. For example, we can see
that although the overall enrollment rate for the smartest students (SAT>1200) is high
across family income, there is significant variation in the quality levels of the colleges.
29% of the high school graduates from the lowest income quartile enroll in the best
colleges compared to 47% of those from the highest family income quartile. Overall,
this suggests that family income plays an important role for college quality choices.
I focus on three important aspects regarding college outcomes: (i) the fraction of
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Figure 1: Two- or Four-Year College Distribution by Family Income and SAT
Figure 2: College Quality Distribution by Family Income and SAT
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college students who manage to complete a degree; (ii) the number of years it takes
to receive a bachelor’s degree; (iii) how much students work in school. The statistics
are summarized in Table 1. Note that the fraction of individuals with a college degree,
either Associate degree or Bachelor’s degree, is calculated conditional on having enrolled
in college. For example, 31% of high school graduates in family income quartile 1
enrolled in 2-year college. Among them, 34% managed to complete their education in
2-year colleges and attain an Associate degree. While there does not seem to be much
difference across family income levels for 2-year colleges, the college outcomes for 4-year
colleges vary according to family income. Specifically, we see that students from rich
families are more likely to complete a bachelor’s degree and they take less time to finish
the degree. At the same time, the amount of time spent working while enrolled in 4-year
colleges decreases with family income. To look at the correlation between the time to
complete the bachelor’s degree and individual characteristics and choices, I regress the
time to bachelor’s degree on the college quality, SAT level, family income and total years
worked in school in the first panel of Table 2. The college quality is negatively correlated
with the time to bachelor’s degree. Students from the highest college quality quartile
on average take 0.32 years less to graduate. On the other hand, the time to degree goes
up with the total years worked in school. The coefficient on the total years worked in
school implies that working full-time in school for a year extends the graduation time
by 0.27 years. The coefficients on both the SAT and family income are statistically
insignificant. I exclude the total years worked in school in the second specification of
Table 2 and I find that the R2 declines from 0.24 to 0.07, suggesting a high explanatory
power of in-school labor supply on the time needed to graduate.
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Table 1: College Outcomes by Family Income
Family Income Quartile
1 2 3 4
%Enrolled in 2-year college 31 36 32 25
[46] [48] [47] [43]
%with AA 34 34 33 30
[47] [47] [47] [46]
%Enrolled in 4-year college 38 41 59 79
[49] [49] [49] [41]
%with BA 58 62 66 76
[50] [49] [47] [43]
Time to BA 4.93 4.87 4.75 4.72
[1.42] [1.23] [1.07] [1.08]
Avg Yrs Worked 2.91 2.88 2.49 1.97
by BA Graduation [2.23] [1.92] [1.79] [1.47]
AA: Associate Degree, BA: Bachelor’s Degree. College completion
rate is calculated as the fraction of college students who completed
the degree. Standard deviation is in the bracket.
Table 2: Regression of Time to BA Degree Regression
(1) (2)
College Quality Q2 -0.0417 -0.062
[0.123] [0.135]
College Quality Q3 -0.0937 -0.207
[0.119] [0.129]
College Quality Q4 -0.325∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗
[0.115] [0.122]
800≤SAT≤ 1200 0.171 0.062
[0.173] [0.187]
SAT>1200 0.149 0.019
[0.178] [0.194]
Family Income (In Thousands) 0.0007 9.45e-5
[0.0005] [0.0005]
Total Years Worked by BA Graduation 0.270∗∗∗
[0.033]
Constant 3.992∗∗∗ 4.830 ∗∗∗
[0.211] [0.198]
R2 0.240 0.069
Observations 409 409
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are in the bracket.
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Table 3: Student Loan Debt by Family Income Among BA Graduates
% With Positive Debt Avg Amount Borrowed
(cond. on borrowing)
Family Income Quartile 1 79[41] $17480[13071]
Family Income Quartile 2 81[40] $16014[10726]
Family Income Quartile 3 67[47] $19059[12490]
Family Income Quartile 4 42[49] $18260[13163]
The standard deviation is in the bracket.
Next, I summarize statistics on student loan debt. In order to control for the effects
of different education levels, I focus on the 4-year college graduates. Table 3 shows the
fraction of graduates who borrow student loan debt conditional on the family income
quartile and SAT levels. We see that the fraction of students who borrow tends to go
down as the family income quartile increases. About 80% of students in the bottom two
family income quartiles borrow while only 42% of those in the highest family income
quartile take out student loan debt. To look at the correlation between post-graduation
wages and student loan debt, I run a log wage regression controlling for college quality,
SAT, family income, experience, occupation and industry. Table 4 shows that the co-
efficient on the student loan debt is -0.003. If an individual has an average amount of
student loan debt, which is $18,000, this coefficient implies a 5.4 percentage point lower
hourly wages.
To summarize, we see that there is a difference across family income levels in college
enrollment, college completion and subsequent labor market performance. In terms of
college enrollment, family income is correlated not only with the binary choice of whether
to go to college, but also where to attend colleges. Both the 4-year college enrollment
rate and the enrollment rate in higher-quality colleges tend to increase with family
income. Apart from the enrollment decision, college outcomes also differ in accordance
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Table 4: Regression of Log Hourly Wage Among BA Graduates
Student Debt (in thousands) −0.003∗
[0.001]
College Quality Q2 0.078
[0.062]
College Quality Q3 0.186∗∗∗
[0.054]
College Quality Q4 0.303∗∗∗
[0.058]
Family Income (in thousands) 0.004∗∗∗
[0.0009]
Family Income Sq (in thousands) -1e-5 ∗∗∗
[2.82e-6]
Experience by BA Graduation 0.031
[0.015]
Experience (Post Graduation) 0.079∗∗∗
[0.019]
Experience Sq (Post Graduation) -0.002
[0.004]
Constant 3.702∗∗∗
[0.356]
R2 0.27
Observations 1845
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Occupations
and industries are included. Standard errors are in
the bracket.
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with family income. Students from lower-income families are more likely to take out
student loan debt and work more in school. These lower-income students have a lower
college completion rate compared to students from richer families. The data also shows
that the time to degree is positively correlated with the amount of work in school and
it is declining over the family income.
The discrepancy in college completion rate and the quality of the college degree across
family income levels could potentially explain the persistent lifetime earnings differences
between individuals from poor and rich families. It is therefore important to understand
to what degree these correlations are driven by financial restrictions and what kind of
policies can improve the current situation.
The model I build and estimate in this paper is designed to replicate the data patterns
derived above and to distinguish the channels through which such trends arise. The
estimated model is used to evaluate whether policies that aim to subsidize 2-year colleges
and reform the student loan debt structure could improve education outcomes for the
less wealthy and alleviate the income inequality problem. I will now progress to describe
the model in more details.
4 Model
4.1 Basic Structure
In this section I lay out my model by describing all the elements of the decision problem of
an individual. A model period corresponds to one year. All individuals start out as high
school students and make decisions for 45 periods until age 61. Individuals are initially
heterogeneous in their family income (yf ), SAT score (SAT ), and the unobserved type
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(k). The unobserved types allow for permanent heterogeneity in preferences for schooling
and labor supply, admissions and schooling accumulation probabilities, family transfers,
and initial human capital.
4.1.1 Choice Sets
In the first period, a high school student chooses whether to finish high school (shs = 1),
or drop out (shs = 0). If he chooses to finish, he will get a high school diploma by the
end of the period. If he drops out, he can work right away but will never be able to
enroll in school again.
At the beginning of the second period, each high school graduate decides on whether
to apply to college. Individuals can apply to a set of types of colleges. Specifically, there
are five types of schools, four types of 4-year colleges, each distinguished by a particular
quality of education (Q ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}), and 2-year colleges. For ease of notation, I denote
the quality level of community colleges by Q = 5. The admissions rules will be discussed
later. After the set of admitted colleges realizes, an individual makes schooling, labor
supply, student loan debt, and savings decisions and continue to make these decisions
in each following period. An individual can choose to enroll in a 4-year college that
admits him, a 2-year college, or not to enroll in college. I use an indicator for 4-year
and 2-year college enrollment denoted by sut and s
c
t respectively. An individual is not
allowed to enroll in any college after age 30. At a given period t, there are three labor
supply intensities (ht): no work (ht = 0), part-time work (ht = 0.5), and full-time work
(ht = 1). When an individual is enrolled in college, he chooses the amount of student
loans to borrow (dt ≥ 0). In each period, he also decides on the amount of savings
(xt ≥ 0) to hold.
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4.1.2 State Space
The state vector (Ωt) contains the initial conditions: family income (yf ), SAT and the
unobserved type (k). In addition, it contains the following variables: COAQ denotes the
net cost of attendance for a college type Q. xt is the amount of savings in the standard
risk free bond. Dt is the total amount of student loan debt and Tdt is the number of
periods left on repayment of student loan debt in period t. st−1 denotes the enrollment
status in period t − 1. Sut , Sct , Sgt measure the years of completed schooling in 4-year
college, 2-year college and graduate school, respectively. There are two states related to
the labor market. ept is the years of experience accumulated and zt−1 denotes the state
of the persistent wage shock in period t− 1. In total Ωt looks as follows
Ωt = (yf , SAT, k,COAQ, xt, Dt,Tdt, st−1, Sut , S
c
t , S
g
t , ept, zt−1) . (1)
4.1.3 Preferences
At the beginning of period t, individuals observe the preference shocks to both schooling
and working summarized by t. The period utility function is an augmented CRRA
utility given by
Ut = δs
c1−αkt
1− αk + g(s
u
t−1, s
c
t−1, s
u
t , s
c
t , Q, ht, k, SAT, t, t), (2)
where αk is the constant relative risk aversion parameter, and it can differ by the
unobserved type k. Note that the marginal utility of consumption is shifted by δs,
which is a function of the college enrollment status. This is to capture the potential
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difference in the preference for consumption between students and those who are not
enrolled. g(·) contains utility values from schooling and working. Specifically, at the
college application stage, it includes preferences toward different types of colleges. When
students are enrolled in college, they incur psychic costs, which are a function of both the
previous and current enrollments status, the unobserved type k, and their SAT scores.
When an individual works in period t, they pay the utility costs associated with working
which vary by the enrollment status and the work intensity. The exact functional form
of Ut is given in Appendix A.
4.1.4 Application and Admissions
Individuals choose a portfolio of colleges to apply to at the beginning of the second
period. They pay the application cost which is a function of the number of types of
schools applied (N), CApp(N, k) = c
1,k
AppN − c2,kApp max{0, N − 1}. The application cost is
paid in terms of foregone utility.
An individual is admitted to college quality quartile Q if IQAdm = 1. His admissions
probability into college quality quartile Q is a function of his SAT and the unobserved
type. I categorize the SAT score of each individual into three groups. Group 1 contains
SAT scores below 800, group 2 SAT scores between 800 and 1200, and group 3 SAT
scores above 1200. Here and in the following I(·) denotes the indicator function of the
set described in (·).
Pr(IQAdm = 1) =
2∑
k=1
I(type = k)
(
g0,kAdm,Q + g
1
Adm,QI(SAT = 2) + g
2
Adm,QI(SAT = 3)
)
(3)
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4.1.5 Net Cost of Attendance
The net cost of attendance is defined as the total cost of attendance net of grants and
aids. An individual draws this cost only once, before making his application decisions
from the distribution of the net cost of attendance for community colleges and each
quality level of the four-year colleges. The distribution for each type of colleges is
assumed to be log-normal:
log(COAQ) ∼ N(µQ(yf , SAT), σ2Q) (4)
µQ(yf , SAT) =
3∑
m=1
µ1,mQ I(SAT = m) + µ
2
Qyf (5)
4.1.6 Schooling Accumulation
An individual who enrolls in college in a given period completes a year of schooling with
a probability which is a function of the unobserved type, the labor supply and the 4-year
college quality quartile.
Pr(ISchi = 1) =Φ
( 2∑
k=1
g0,kSch,iI(type = k)− g1Sch,iI(ht = 0.5)− g2Sch,iI(ht = 1)
+
4∑
q=2
g3,qSch,uI(Q = q)
)
, (6)
where i ∈ {u, c}. ISchu and ISchc is an indicator for completing a year of schooling
in 4-year college and 2-year college, respectively. I assume that an individual obtains
a bachelor’s degree when he completes four years of schooling in four-year colleges and
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he obtains an associate degree with two years of completed schooling in 2-year colleges.
Individuals can go to graduate school after the bachelor’s degree.10
4.1.7 Wage Process
The wage process is given by
wt = exp(Ht + zt + t), (7)
whereHt is the amount of human capital accumulated at time t. uk is the initial human
capital of an individual of unobserved type k, and ept is the total experience at time t.
Individuals gain human capital from the number of years of completed schooling in 4-year
colleges (Sut ), community colleges (S
c
t ), and graduate school (S
g
t ). The human capital is
also increased from earning an education degree (HD). There are four education levels:
high school dropouts, high school graduates, associate degree and bachelor’s degree,
denoted by HD = 0, 1, 2, 3, respectively. The labor market return to a bachelor’s degree
can differ according to the college quality Q. κkH allows the unobserved type to affect
the labor market return to an education degree. I normalize κ1H to 1. t ∼ N(0, σ2 ) is
an i.i.d productivity shock. zt is a persistent wage shock, which I discretize into two
states (z, z¯). zt evolves according to a Markov process and the transition probability
(zp) is the same for all individuals.
10Individuals can continue to enroll in college after completing the bachelor’s degree. I do not
explicitly model the return to various professional degrees or other advanced degrees.
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Ht =
2∑
k=1
I(type = k)uk + φ1ept + φ2ep
2
t + φ3I(HD = 1) + φ4S
u
t + φ5S
c
t + φ6S
g
t
+
2∑
k=1
I(type = k)κkH
(
φ5mI(HD = 2) +
(
φ1m +
4∑
q=2
φqmI(Q = q)
)
I(HD = 3)
)
. (8)
The accumulation of experience is given by:
ept+1 = ept +mep, (9)
mep =
( ∑
i=0,1,2,3
χiHDI(HD = i)
)(
I(ht = 1) + 0.5I(ht = 0.5)
)
I(st = 0)
+
∑
i=u,c
(
χisI(ht = 1) + 0.5χ
i
sI(ht = 0.5)
)
I(sit = 1). (10)
where I normalize χ3HD to 1. The accumulation of experience can differ according to
education levels and the enrollment status. This captures the heterogeneity in the wage
growth patterns across people with different education degrees and enrollment status
observed in the data.
4.1.8 Family Transfers
In the initial period, the family transfer is a function of the high school enrollment status
(shs), the family income (yf ), the savings of the individual (xt), and the unobserved type
(k).
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trt = max{γ1I(shs = 1) + γ2yfI(shs = 1) + γ7yf + γ8xt +
2∑
k=1
γk9 I(type = k) + tr, 0}
(11)
From the second period on, the family transfer function is given by
trt = max
{
γ3I(s
u
t = 1) +
4∑
q=1
γq4yfI(s
u
t = 1, Q = q) + γ5I(s
c
t = 1) + γ6yfI(s
c
t = 1)
+ γ7yf + γ8xt +
2∑
k=1
γk9 I(type = k) + γ10t+ tr, 0
}
, (12)
where the amount of family transfer is a function of the college enrollment status
(sut , s
c
t), the family income (yf ), the savings of the individual (xt), and the unobserved
type (k). There is also a shock to the family transfer (tr ∼ N(0, σ2tr)) to capture
fluctuations in the family income and other unexpected events that affect the family
transfers.
4.1.9 Borrowing and Savings
There are two types of assets: student loan debt and the risk-free asset. In any given
period, an individual can save in the risk-free asset at a rate Rs. When an individual
is enrolled in college, he can take out student loan debt. I incorporate the key elements
of the federal student loan program in the US. The repayment schedule of the student
loan debt in the model features the standard fixed repayment plan in the US. There
are three main features. First, an individual cannot borrow more than the net cost of
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attendance and there is a fixed maximum limit on the total amount of student loan debt
(D¯). Second, an individual does not repay any student loan debt while enrolled in school
but interests accrue during this period at a rate Re.
11 Third, when an individual is not
enrolled in school, he has in total 10 years to completely pay off his debt. The repayment
amount is fixed and the same over the whole repayment period. It is a constant amount
such that the total amount of student loan debt owed and its accrued interest at a rate
Rd are fully repaid by the end of the 10th year after leaving school.
4.1.10 Budget Constraint
If an individual is not enrolled in school, his budget constraint is given by
ct + xt+1 = T (wtht) + trt − ppt +Rsxt, (13)
where savings xt+1 ≥ 0. ppt is amount of student loan debt repayment at period t, and
is calculated as ppt =
Dt∑Tdt−1
t=0
1
(Rd)
t
. Tdt is the number of repayment periods at period
t. After the repayment the total amount of student loan debt is Dt+1 = (Dt − ppt)Rd.
T (·) denotes the after-tax labor income. I include the progressive labor income taxation
schedule. The after-tax labor income follows the specification in Aizawa and Fang (2013)
and Kaplan (2012), and they approximate the U.S. tax code by
T (y) = τ0 + τ1
y1+τ2
1 + τ2
, (14)
11For the subsidized federal student loan debt students do not need to pay the interests accumulated
during school. Since the data does not distinguish subsidized and unsubsidized student loans, I assume
all loans are unsubsidized.
30
where τ0 > 0, τ1 > 0 and τ2 < 0.
If an individual is enrolled in school, his budget constraint is given by
ct + xt+1 = T (wtht) + dt + trt −
5∑
q=1
COAQI(Q = q) +Rsxt, (15)
where xt+1 ≥ 0, dt is the amount of student loan debt taken out in period t and is
capped by the net cost of attendance, dt ≤ COAQ. The total amount of student loan
debt Dt+1 evolves as Dt+1 = (Dt + dt)Re and is bounded by the fixed maximum limit
D¯. When an individual is not employed, he will get unemployment benefit, yb.
4.1.11 Unobserved Type Distribution
There are two unobserved types. The type distribution is a function of two initial
conditions, the family income (yf ) and the SAT level. The probability of being a type
2 agent is given by
Pr(type = 2) =
exp(pi0 + pi1yf + pi2I(SAT = 2) + pi3I(SAT = 3))
1 + exp(pi0 + pi1yf + pi2I(SAT = 2) + pi3I(SAT = 3))
. (16)
4.2 Optimization Problem Over the Life Cycle
At period t, an individual maximizes the sum of his flow utility and the expected utility
for the remaining lifetime given the state space Ωt:
Vt(Ωt) = max
j∈CJt
Ut(j) + βE[Vt+1(Ωt+1|j,Ωt)], (17)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of preference shocks and
wage shocks, and the probability of schooling accumulation. j is the combination of
choices over schooling, work, student loan debt, and savings which are within the choice
set at time t, denoted by CJt . β is the discount factor.
At the college application stage, an individual chooses an application portfolio (m)
from the set of available combination of colleges (MJ) to solve the following maximiza-
tion problem:
Vt(Ωt) = max
m⊆MJ
∑
o⊆m
Pr(o|Ωt)E[Vt(o,Ωt)]− CApp(m|Ωt), (18)
where Pr(o|Ωt) =
∏
j∈o Pr(I
j
Adm = 1|Ωt)
∏
l∈mro (1− Pr(I lAdm = 1|Ωt)) is the proba-
bility that the set of colleges o ⊆ m admits an individual with state space Ωt. CApp(m|Ωt)
is the application cost of the portfolio m.
4.3 Solution Method
I solve the model by backward recursion. At any period, to solve for the expected
continuation value (Vt+1) at a given state space point, which I refer to as Emax, I
approximate the integral using Monte Carlo integration. Specifically, I randomly take A
draws of the set of shocks from their respective distributions. Conditional on each draw,
I solve Vt+1 in equation (4.17). I then average over the A draws to calculate the value of
the Emax at time t. Since the state space is very big, it is computationally infeasible to
solve Emax at any given state space point. I follow the approximation method in Keane
and Wolpin (2001). First, I randomly draw a set of state space points and I solve for
Emax at these points. Second, I regress the Emax values on these state space points on
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a set of linear and quadratic terms of the state variables. Using the coefficients obtained
from the regression, I approximate the Emax on all the other state space points that
are not drawn.
5 Estimation
In this section, I first discuss the intuition for the identification of the model parameters.
Then, I describe the estimation strategy.
5.1 Identification
The utility function characterizes the value an individual attaches to work and school.
Although the terms of the utility function cannot be observed from the data, they govern
the choices individuals make, which allows us to infer these parameters. The disutility
of working and the shocks to it can be identified from the level of labor supply and
its variation over time. The psychic cost of schooling for a given SAT level is mainly
determined by the level of enrollment in each broad type of colleges by SAT level in the
data. The change in the enrollment behavior between periods identifies the variance of
shocks to the psychic costs of schooling. The fraction of individuals who drop out and re-
enroll pins down the cost of interrupted enrollment. The fraction of individuals transfer
from 2-year college to 4-year college implies the disutility of such type of transfer. The
preference for college quality at the application stage is pinned down by the difference
in the application behaviors.
Unobserved types mainly capture the permanent heterogeneity across individuals. For
example, if there are two individuals with the same observed initial conditions but who
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consistently make different choices, then they have different unobserved types. Since
an individual’s type directly affects all the decisions it makes, the distribution of types
is mainly identified through the overall fit of the model to the data. Similarly, risk
aversion is also not easy to identify since it affects individual’s college choices, both the
enrollment and drop out behavior, and their willingness to borrow. It requires the joint
fit of the moments on college decisions and borrowing behavior.
Apart from the utility function, unobserved types and risk aversions, almost all other
parameters can be directly identified from the data. The college admissions function for
each college type is pinned down using the application data and the admissions results
observed in the subsample of the NLSY97 data. Similarly, net cost of attendance and
the family transfer function have data counterparts that can identify the level of each
component. For the schooling accumulation probability, I have both the enrollment
data and the grade completion records to determine the function. The wage process is
identified using the annual individual wage records. The difference in the accumulation
of experience across education attainment is pinned down by the difference in the wage
growth observed in groups with different education attainment.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
The model parameters are estimated using the simulated method of moments. The
parameter estimates are found by minimizing a weighted distance measure between a
set of aggregate moments constructed from the data and their model counterparts. The
weights are given by the inverse of the estimated variances of the data moments.
Some parameters (summarized in Table 5) are calibrated before the estimation proce-
dure. I set the discount factor at 0.99. The interest rate for savings in a riskless asset is
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1.01. The interest rates for the student loans are calculated as the average real interest
rates of the federal student loans over the sample period. I use the parameters for the
progressive tax schedule in Aizawa and Fang (2013) and Kaplan (2012) who approxi-
mate the US tax code by T (y) = τ0 + τ1
y1+τ2
1+τ2
and determine the parameters from the
National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM program.
Description Value
β Discount Factor 0.99
Interest Rate
Rs Riskless Asset,Savings 1.01
Rd Student Loan (in Repayment) 1.03
Re Student Loan (in School) 1.024
Tax Schedule
τ0 0.0056
τ1 0.6377
τ2 -0.1362
Table 5: Calibrated Parameters
In total I match 494 moments. The following is a list of moments employed in the
estimation:
1. College Enrollment
• Enrollment rate in 4-year colleges over time, and by family income quartiles
• Enrollment rate in 2-year colleges over time, and by family income quartiles
• Enrollment rate in 4-year and 2-year colleges by family income quartiles and
SAT
• Enrollment rate in 4-year college quality quartiles by family income quartiles
and SAT
• Admissions rate by 4-year college quality quartiles
• Persistence rate in enrollment in 2-year and 4-year college
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• Fraction of stop-outs re-enrolled in 2-year and 4-year college
2. College Outcomes
• Average years of schooling in 2-year colleges by family income quartiles
• Average years of schooling in 4-year colleges by family income quartiles
• Fraction graduated with Associate Degree by family income quartiles
• Fraction graduated with Bachelor’s Degree by family income quartiles
• Fraction graduated with Bachelor’s Degree by college quality quartiles
• Time to Bachelor’s Degree by family income quartiles
• Time to Bachelor’s Degree by college quality quartiles
• Fraction completed a year of schooling in 2-year and 4-year college
3. Labor Supply
• Fraction worked part-time over time, by education levels
• Fraction worked full-time over time, by education levels
4. Wages
• Average log hourly wages over time, by education levels
• Average log hourly wages of 4-year college graduates over time, by college
quality quartiles
5. Cost of Attendance, Student Loan and Family Transfers
• Average cost of attendance for 4-year colleges (by college quality quartiles)
and 2-year colleges
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• Fraction of 4-year enrollees who borrowed student loans by family income
quartiles
• Fraction of 2-year enrollees who borrowed student loans by family income
quartiles
• Fraction of 4-year graduates who borrowed student loans by family income
quartiles
• Fraction of 2-year graduates who borrowed student loans by family income
quartiles
• Average debt size of 2-year graduates by family income quartiles
• Average debt size of 4-year graduates by family income quartiles
• Average family transfers by family income quartiles
• Average savings by family income quartiles12
6 Estimation Results
In this section, I analyze the key parameter estimates. Next, I show the model fit. After
that, I discuss how the college completion rate is affected by working in school and
college quality.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates of primary interests are summarized in Table 6 to Table 9.
The rest of the parameters can be found in Appendix B.
12When I calculate the average savings level in the data, I also include the savings of individuals with
negative savings.
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6.1.1 Preferences
Table 6 shows the estimates of key utility parameters. First, the risk aversion differs
between types. Type 1 has a risk aversion of 1.3 while Type 2’s risk aversion is 2.2,
suggesting that Type 2 agents are much more risk averse than Type 1 agents. The
preference for 2-year colleges is normalized to 0 for both types. Students’ preferences
for different college quality levels are different both across types and within the types.
These preference parameters capture the individual’s taste/expectation when he makes
decision about which college quality to apply to. For each type of agent, the psychic
cost of schooling in 4-year colleges tend to be lower for higher SAT groups as higher
ability makes it easier for students to keep up with the courses. Compared to the psychic
costs of 4-year colleges, the psychic cost of schooling is lower for 2-year colleges, which
is not surprising as courses are usually harder in 4-year college. The utility parameter
estimates of working in school, both full-time and part-time, are not positive. For both
types of agents the utility cost of working is higher for 4-year colleges than for 2-year
colleges. This implies that it is less costly in terms of utilities to work in 2-year colleges.
This cost could capture the lost time working student could have used to participate in
school events and join student clubs. Compared to 4-year colleges, 2-year colleges do
not offer much a campus life, which is likely to reduce the cost of spending time working.
Moreover, community colleges tend to offer a more flexible course schedule such as more
evening classes to accommodate students who work.
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Table 6: Key Utility Parameter Estimates
Description Estimate S.E.
Risk Aversion
α1 Risk aversion (k=1) 1.300 0.00002
α2 Risk aversion (k=2) 2.200 0.00007
Preference for College Quality
µ1,1cq Preference for 4-year college Q1 (k=1) 0.150 0.00077
µ1,2cq Preference for 4-year college Q2 (k=1) -0.174 0.00264
µ1,3cq Preference for 4-year college Q3 (k=1) -0.521 0.0024
µ1,4cq Preference for 4-year college Q4 (k=1) -1.000 0.0046
µ2,1cq Preference for 4-year college Q1 (k=2) 0.015 0.00003
µ2,2cq Preference for 4-year college Q2 (k=2) 0.015 0.00002
µ2,3cq Preference for 4-year college Q3 (k=2) 0.000 0.000003
µ2,4cq Preference for 4-year college Q4 (k=2) 0.000 0.00004
Psychic Cost of Schooling
4-year College:
µu,1,1ec Cost for k=1 -0.65 0.00032
µu,1,2ec Change in cost for k=1, 800<SAT≤1200 0.150 0.00020
µu,1,3ec Change in cost for k=1, SAT>1200 0.180 0.00045
µu,2,1ec Cost for k=2 -0.027 0.000003
µu,2,2ec Change in cost for k=2, 800<SAT≤1200 0.008 0.000004
µu,2,3ec Change in cost for k=2, SAT>1200 0.011 0.000005
2-year College:
µc,1ec Cost for k=1 -0.450 0.00069
µc,2ec Cost for k=2 -0.040 0.000002
Disutility of Working in School
4-year College:
λ11 Cost of part-time work,k=1 -0.200 0.00067
λ12 Cost of full-time work,k=1 -0.250 0.00052
λ21 Cost of part-time work,k=2 -0.003 0.000002
λ22 Cost of full-time work,k=2 -0.000 0.000016
2-year College:
λ13 Cost of part-time work,k=1 -0.030 0.0007
λ14 Cost of full-time work,k=1 -0.100 0.0014
λ23 Cost of part-time work,k=2 -0.000 0.000069
λ24 Cost of full-time work,k=2 -0.000 0.00005
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Table 7: Schooling Accumulation
Description Estimate S.E.
4-year College:
g0,1Sch,u Constant,k=1 1.000 0.00158
g0,2Sch,u Constant,k=2 0.900 0.00065
g1Sch,u Coefficient on part-time work 0.180 0.0003
g2Sch,u Coefficient on full-time work 0.600 0.00046
g3,2Sch,u Coefficient on college quality Q2 0.160 0.00116
g3,3Sch,u Coefficient on college quality Q3 0.100 0.0006
g3,4Sch,u Coefficient on college quality Q4 0.400 0.00175
2-year College:
g0,1Sch,c Constant,k=1 0.350 0.00347
g0,2Sch,c Constant,k=2 0.350 0.00294
g1Sch,c Coefficient on part-time work 0.000 0.00195
g2Sch,c Coefficient on full-time work 0.050 0.00178
6.1.2 Schooling Accumulation
Table 7 shows the schooling accumulation function for both 4-year colleges and 2-year
colleges. A student in 4-year college who does not work has a higher probability of
completing a year of schooling if he is of type 1. Working in 4-year colleges reduces
the likelihood of advancing a grade. Full-time work has a much larger negative effect
on schooling accumulation than part-time work. A better college quality tends to make
it easier to progress in college. This captures the idea that colleges of higher quality
tend to have better institutional resources which facilitate students to advance further.
In 2-year colleges, the probability of progressing a year in 2-year colleges is much lower
compared to 4-year colleges. Working in in 2-year colleges is much less costly compared
to 4-year colleges.
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Table 8: Wage Process
Description Estimate S.E.
u1 Constant,k=1 2.558 0.00089
u2 Constant,k=2 2.350 0.001
φ1 Coefficient on experience 0.075 0.000002
φ2 Coefficient on experience square -0.002 7.93E
−9
φ3 Coefficient on high school diploma 0.025 0.00032
φ4 Coefficient on 4-year schooling 0.015 0.000003
φ5 Coefficient on 2-year schooling 0.010 0.000016
φ6 Coefficient on graduate school schooling 0.015 0.01
φ1m Return to college quality Q1 graduate 0.040 0.00006
φ2m Change in return to college quality Q2 (compared to Q1) 0.079 0.00016
φ3m Change in return to college quality Q3 (compared to Q1) 0.160 0.000146
φ4m Change in return to college quality Q4 (compared to Q1) 0.206 0.00019
φ5m Coefficient on Associate Degree 0.027 0.000086
κ2H Type shifter 0.900 0.00073
6.1.3 Wage Progress
Table 8 shows the parameter estimates for the wage equation. Type 1 individuals have
higher initial human capital. There is 1.5% return to a high school diploma and 2.7%
return to an associate degree. Each year of completed schooling is also rewarding. There
is 1.5% and 1% return for each year of completed schooling in 4-year colleges and 2-year
colleges, respectively. There are very heterogeneous labor market returns to different
college qualities. For Type 1 individuals, the labor market return to college quality
quartile 1 is 10% while 26% for quality quartile 4. Compared to Type 1 individuals, the
degree premium for Type 2 individuals is 10 percent lower.
6.1.4 Type Distribution by Family Income and SAT
Table 9 shows the type distribution. Since my model has two types, I directly show the
fraction of type 1 individuals in each family income quartile and SAT level group. The
table suggests that an individual is more likely to be of type 1 if he is from a richer
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family. Higher SAT level also tends to increase the likelihood to be of type 1. For
example, the fraction of type 1 individuals in family income quartile 4 and with a SAT
higher than 1200 points is 90% while it is only 13% in the lowest family income quartile
and lowest SAT level group.
Table 9: Estimated Type 1 Proportion by Family Income and SAT
SAT≤800 800<SAT≤ 1200 SAT>1200
Family Income Quartile 1 0.13 0.20 0.18
Family Income Quartile 2 0.26 0.36 0.33
Family Income Quartile 3 0.44 0.55 0.52
Family Income Quartile 4 0.86 0.91 0.90
Combined with the parameter estimates in the previous tables, we find that individuals
from richer families tend to have a higher SAT and higher permanent ability (unobserved
ability) level. These individuals are less risk averse and gain more in terms of labor
market returns from attending the same type of college.
6.2 Model Fit
Next, I present tables and figures on the model fit to show that the model can fit the
most salient features of the data.
Figure 3 to Figure 5 shows the model fit of the distribution of college enrollment in
2-year and 4-year colleges by family income given a SAT level. The model matches
quite well the increasing enrollment in 4-year colleges and declining enrollment in ‘2-
year colleges only’ with family income. The model also captures the higher transfer rate
between 2-year colleges and 4-year colleges in the middle-income groups.
Figure 6 to Figure 8 shows the college quality distribution by family income for each
level of SAT scores. The data shows that the fraction of individuals in higher quality
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Figure 3: Two- or Four-Year College Distribution by Family Income, SAT≤800
Figure 4: Two- or Four-Year College Distribution by Family Income, 800<SAT≤1200
colleges increases with the family income and the pattern is particularly obvious for the
highest college quality quartile. The model is able to fit this data pattern reasonably
well.
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Figure 5: Two- or Four-Year College Distribution by Family Income, SAT>1200
Figure 6: College Quality Distribution by Family Income, SAT≤800
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the match of the enrollment patterns in 4-year and 2-
year college over time. For 4-year college, the model can capture the stable enrollment
rate in the first 4 years and the steep drop in the fifth year. However, it underpredicts
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Figure 7: College Quality Distribution by Family Income, 800<SAT≤1200
Figure 8: College Quality Distribution by Family Income, SAT>1200
the enrollment in later years. For 2-year colleges the model can replicate the declining
pattern in the data but it overpredicts the enrollment in the first year and generates
a lower level in later-year enrollment than the data. The reason why model estimates
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could not easily adjust to generate higher 2-year college enrollment in later periods is
because the model already overpredicts the fraction of individuals with an associate
degree in the population, as shown in Table 10.
Figure 9: Enrollment in 4-Year Colleges Over Time
Figure 10: Enrollment in 2-Year Colleges Over Time
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Table 10: Distribution of Education Attainment
Data Sim
High School Dropouts 0.16 0.16
High School Graduates 0.45 0.44
Associate Degree 0.07 0.09
Bachelor’s Degree 0.32 0.31
I show in Table 11 the 4-year college completion rate by family income, and by college
quality levels. The fraction of students who obtained a Bachelor’s Degree increases with
the family income quartile. Among those who enrolled in 4-year colleges, the graduation
rate is also increasing with college quality level. The model is able to capture these
patterns. However, the model underpredicts the graduation rate at the lowest college
quality quartile but overpredicts the rate for the highest college quality quartile.
Table 11: Fraction with Bachelor’s Degree
Data Sim
% %
Family Income
Quartile 1 58 50
Quartile 2 62 60
Quartile 3 66 68
Quartile 4 76 84
College Quality
Quartile 1 56 43
Quartile 2 69 66
Quartile 3 78 82
Quartile 4 81 91
In the data, the amount of time taken to finish a bachelor’s degree is declining with
family income and with the college quality level. The model can capture this pattern
although it overestimates the time needed to graduate from the highest college quality
(Table 12). In Table 13 I show that the model matches the decreasing trend in labor
market experience in school by family income among the 4-year college graduates.
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Table 12: Time to BA Degree (Years)
Data Sim
Family Income Quartile 1 4.93 4.79
Family Income Quartile 2 4.87 5.00
Family Income Quartile 3 4.75 4.80
Family Income Quartile 4 4.72 4.78
College Quality Quartile 1 5.00 4.95
College Quality Quartile 2 4.92 4.88
College Quality Quartile 3 4.83 4.89
College Quality Quartile 4 4.42 4.58
Table 13: Average Years Worked by BA Graduation
Data Sim
Family Income Quartile 1 2.91 2.89
Family Income Quartile 2 2.88 2.89
Family Income Quartile 3 2.49 2.53
Family Income Quartile 4 1.97 1.99
The model matches the average cost of attendance by college types reasonably well.
Table 15 shows the model also matches well the fraction that borrows student loan debt
among 4-year college graduates.
Table 14: Mean Cost of Attendance by College Types
Data Sim
College Quality Quartile 1 $14,310 $14,260
College Quality Quartile 2 $15,060 $15,010
College Quality Quartile 3 $17,300 $18,000
College Quality Quartile 4 $20,800 $20,800
2-Year Colleges $12,200 $11,800
The values are in 2006 constant dollars.
The last three figures in this section show the model fit of the wage patterns and
overall labor supply. In Figure 11, the most important feature is that for any given
year, the log hourly wages increases with college quality levels. The model can capture
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Table 15: Fraction Borrowed by Family Income (BA Graduates)
Data Sim
% %
Family Income Quartile 1 79 81
Family Income Quartile 2 81 79
Family Income Quartile 3 67 66
Family Income Quartile 4 42 44
this pattern. Figure 12 shows the log hourly wage is increasing in education levels, and
the model matches the wage levels quite well. In the data, the fraction of individuals
working full time is increasing while the part time workers get less over time. Figure 13
shows that the model can generate this feature.
Figure 11: Log Hourly Wages By College Quality Post 4-Year College Graduation
6.3 Understanding College Completion
The estimation results show that working negatively affects college completion rate
while attending a college of better quality tends to lead to a higher completion rate. To
49
Figure 12: Log Hourly Wages By Education
Figure 13: Part- and Full-time Employment Over time
understand how the gap in the college completion rate between the lowest and highest
family income quartile is affected by these two channels, I turn off each channel at a
time and re-solve the model. The results are shown in Table 16. The first column shows
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that in the baseline the gap is 34.0 percentage points between family income quartile
1 and quartile 4. When working in school does not affect schooling accumulation, the
college completion rate goes up by 22.8 percentage points for students from family
income quartile 1 while it only rises by 8.4 percentage points for students in quartile 4.
It therefore reduces the difference in college completion rate between students from the
lowest and highest family income quartile. On the other hand, when there is no effect
of college quality on schooling accumulation probabilities, the gap in college completion
rate widens as shown in the third column of Table 16. Students from family income
quartile 1 are more likely to drop out whereas students in quartile 4 are not too responsive
to changes in the schooling accumulation rate. The results indicate that there are two
important ways to bring down the discrepancy in the college completion rate across
family income levels. One way is to reduce the amount of time students from low-
income families spend working while in college. The other way is to encourage low-
income students to attend better quality colleges as their dropout decisions are more
sensitive to the schooling accumulation probabilities.
Table 16: Bachelor’s Degree Completion Rate
Baseline No Effect of Working No Effect of College Quality
(1) (2) (3)
Family Income Q1 50.0 72.8 38.4
Family Income Q4 84.0 92.4 76.5
Gap between Q1 and Q4 34.0 19.6 38.1
7 Counterfactual Analysis
Using the estimated model, I conduct counterfactual experiments to study the impli-
cations of different policies. First, I look at a free community college plan. Second, I
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examine the Pay As You Earn repayment plan that was recently implemented in the
US. Third, I analyze a hypothetical loan forgiveness plan. In this section I first describe
these policy measures and their implementations in the model. Then I present the ef-
fects of each policy change on educational outcomes and labor supply behavior. After
that, I discuss how each policy affects lifetime earnings and its fiscal cost. Finally, I
evaluate the welfare implications of these policies.
7.1 The Policy Plans
7.1.1 Free Community College Plan
The free community college plan was proposed by President Obama in the 2015 State
of the Union Address. The goal of the government is to increase the total number of
college graduates and reduce the amount of student loan debt students have to borrow
to finance their education. I implement this plan in the model by setting the tuition for
community college to zero.
7.1.2 Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan (PAYE)
PAYE is a new repayment option which was signed into law in the US at the end of 2012.
There are three major differences between the standard repayment plan in the baseline
and the Pay As You Earn Plan. First, in the standard repayment plan, an individual
pays a fixed amount each year. In the PAYE plan, the repayment amount is linked to
the annual income in that year. Specifically, the amount of repayment is 10% of the
discretionary income, which is defined as the amount of the annual gross income above
150% of the poverty line. I calibrate the poverty line to the single household poverty
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threshold in the 2000s, which is $10, 000 in 2006 constant dollars. Moreover, the period
repayment is capped by what they would have paid in the standard repayment plan.
Second, the repayment period is 10 years for the standard repayment plan. In the new
plan, the maximum repayment period is extended to 20 years. Third, under the stan-
dard repayment plan, everyone has to repay the full amount they owe. In contrast, the
new repayment plan forgives the remaining debt at the end of the 20th repayment pe-
riod. The new repayment plan effectively makes student loan debt cheaper by insuring
individuals against bad income shocks and partially forgiving the debt balance.
7.1.3 Loan Forgiveness Plan
The loan forgiveness plan is not a policy implemented in reality so far. It is motivated
by the fact that the college completion rate is low and college dropouts are burdened
with a sizable amount of debt without enjoying the degree premium. When individuals
take into account the possibility that they may not finish college, some of them will
not even attempt to enroll. In other words, the student loan debt is most costly for
college dropouts and consequently individuals may be discouraged to try out the college
experience. In this experiment, if an individual does not have a bachelor’s degree or
associate degree by age 30, his debt is forgiven at that time.13 For an individual who
successfully completes a degree, the student loan debt is repaid according to the standard
repayment plan.
13In the model no agent can go to school after age 30, so by this age the policy maker is sure if an
individual is a dropout or finished college.
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7.2 Education Outcomes and Labor Supply
7.2.1 Free Community College
The results of this policy are presented in Table 17. Under this policy, the enrollment
rate into 2-year colleges substantially increases for all family income groups, with the
strongest rise occurring in the lowest two family income quartiles. There are two major
reasons why the 2-year college enrollment is so responsive to the policy. The first reason
is that individuals do not have to pay tuition when they enroll in 2-year college. This
is particularly appealing to individuals from low-income families who were unwilling to
enroll in any college before. Second, compared to 4-year colleges, the psychic cost of
2-year college is significantly lower and the utility cost of working in 2-year college is also
lower. Therefore, even the tuition for 2-year colleges is already low before the policy
is implemented, only around $3,000 per year, waiving the tuition goes a long way in
getting individuals into 2-year colleges.
However, this plan negatively affects the enrollment in 4-year colleges. Table 17 shows
that the enrollment rate into 4-year colleges uniformly declines under the reform. As
2-year colleges become even cheaper compared to 4-year colleges, individuals who are
financially constrained are more likely to move away from 4-year colleges to 2-year
colleges. For lower income students, the fraction of those enrolled in the top two college
quality levels are higher than before. This indicates that most of the substitution from
4-year colleges to 2-year colleges occurs for students originally enrolled in low quality
4-year colleges in the baseline.
Overall, the average education level is higher after the reform, with the fraction of
people receiving an associate degree going from 9.2% to 16.4%. This substantial increase
54
in the number of associate degree holders comes from two main sources. First, there
are more people enrolled in 2-year colleges. Second, conditional on being a student at a
2-year college, an individual is less likely to drop out when he fails to complete a year of
schooling. Since there is no tuition at 2-year colleges, students have a higher tendency
to enroll until they finish their degree. Another related reason is that, students tend
to work less in 2-year colleges as they have less financial needs to fulfill. As a result,
students can spend more time studying which gives them a higher chance of passing the
classes.
In contrast to the surge in the number of individuals with an associate degree, there
are fewer individuals that get a bachelor’s degree. The fraction of the population with
this degree falls from 31.1% to 28.3%, a result of both a lower enrollment rate into 4-year
colleges and a lower degree completion rate conditional on enrollment. The reduction in
the degree completion mainly occurs for students in the bottom family income quartiles.
7.2.2 Pay As You Earn
Table 18 summarizes the effects of this policy on education outcomes and labor sup-
ply. In terms of college enrollment, Table 18 shows that this plan mainly affects the
enrollment of individuals in the bottom two family income quartiles. For them, both
the 4-year and 2-year enrollment rates go up. Compared to the low-income students,
the enrollment rate into either 4-year of 2-year colleges for individuals from the highest
family income quartile barely changes. The reason why individuals from less wealthy
families show a stronger response in enrollment is that they are more reliant on student
loan debt to finance their college attendance. As a result, a reduction in the cost of
student loans is more beneficial to these agents. If we compare the change in the enroll-
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Table 17: Effect of Free Community College Plan on Education Outcomes and Labor
Supply
Baseline Reform Percentage Change
Fraction Enrolled in 2-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.380 0.550 44.7%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.433 0.604 39.5%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.387 0.533 37.7%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.249 0.340 36.5%
Fraction Enrolled in 4-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.311 0.280 -10.0%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.409 0.383 -6.4%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.539 0.506 -6.1%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.742 0.709 -4.4%
Fraction In Top 2 College Quality Levels
Family Income Quartile 1 0.400 0.420 5.0%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.420 0.425 1.2%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.398 0.389 -2.2%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.596 0.595 -0.2%
Fraction Completed Bachelor’s Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.502 0.464 -7.6%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.600 0.539 -10.2%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.678 0.639 -5.8%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.837 0.837 -0.0%
Fraction Completed Associate Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.238 0.294 23.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.280 0.344 22.9%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.350 0.431 23.1%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.409 0.509 24.4%
Distribution of Education Degree
High School Dropouts 0.158 0.152 -3.8%
High School Graduates 0.439 0.401 -8.7%
Associate Degree 0.092 0.164 78.3%
Bachelor’s Degree 0.311 0.283 -9.0%
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ment rate in 4-year colleges and in 2-year colleges, we see that the plan is more effective
in getting more individuals into 4-year colleges. This is mainly because 4-year colleges
are more expensive than 2-year colleges. When student loans become cheaper, students
are more likely to take this opportunity to enroll in 4-year colleges.
Besides encouraging more students to enroll in college, the plan also enables students
to attend higher quality colleges. For students in the bottom family income quartile,
the fraction of them who enrolls in top two college quality levels rises by 3.5%. The col-
lege outcomes are also improved. When student loan debt becomes effectively cheaper,
students are more willing to borrow student loan debt. Consequently, they work less in
school to fulfill their consumption needs. As students are more likely to enroll in higher
quality colleges which tend to increase the college completion rate and students invest
more time to study, the overall college completion rate in the population goes up. The
time it takes to complete a bachelor’s degree also mildly declines.
7.2.3 Loan Forgiveness
Table 19 presents the results of this plan. Under this plan, the enrollment rate into
both 4-year colleges and 2-year colleges uniformly increases across all family income
groups with most of the increase concentrated in the lower family income quartiles. The
fraction of students enrolled in top two college quality levels falls because there are more
students enrolled compared to the baseline and these individuals are more likely to go
to lower quality schools.
Although more individuals are enrolled in college, the degree completion rate in both
4-year colleges and 2-year colleges plummets. The completion rate of the bachelor’s
degree goes down and the lower the family income the larger the drop in the completion
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Table 18: Effect of Pay As You Earn Plan on Education Outcomes and Labor Supply
Baseline Reform Percentage Change
Fraction Enrolled in 2-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.380 0.401 5.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.433 0.449 3.7%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.387 0.392 1.3%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.249 0.249 0.0%
Fraction Enrolled in 4-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.311 0.337 8.4%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.409 0.435 6.4%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.539 0.554 2.8%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.742 0.751 1.2%
Fraction In Top 2 College Quality Levels
Family Income Quartile 1 0.400 0.414 3.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.420 0.428 1.9%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.398 0.400 0.5%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.596 0.603 1.2%
Fraction Completed Bachelor’s Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.502 0.531 5.8%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.600 0.606 1.0%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.678 0.698 2.9%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.837 0.847 1.2%
Fraction Completed Associate Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.238 0.256 7.6%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.280 0.290 3.6%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.350 0.354 1.1%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.409 0.413 1.0%
Distribution of Education Degree
High School Dropouts 0.158 0.156 -1.3%
High School Graduates 0.439 0.417 -5.0%
Associate Degree 0.092 0.099 7.6%
Bachelor’s Degree 0.311 0.328 5.5%
Time to Bachelor’s Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 4.789 4.735 -1.1%
Family Income Quartile 2 5.004 4.990 -0.3%
Family Income Quartile 3 4.803 4.791 -0.2%
Family Income Quartile 4 4.782 4.770 -0.2%
Fraction Borrowed Student Loans
by BA Graduation
Family Income Quartile 1 0.814 0.923 13.4%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.791 0.869 9.9%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.660 0.775 17.4%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.440 0.521 18.4%
Average Years Worked by BA Graduation
Family Income Quartile 1 2.892 2.733 -5.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 2.895 2.695 -6.9%
Family Income Quartile 3 2.531 2.376 -6.1%
Family Income Quartile 4 1.989 1.926 -3.2%
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rate. There are two main reasons. One is that more students are enrolled in lower quality
schools which make students less likely to graduate. The other reason is that all the
student loan debt is forgiven if a student does not graduate which reduces the willingness
to finish the degree if an agent already has a lot of debt. Compared to the change in the
completion rate for the bachelor’s degree, the completion rate for the associate degree
declines even more. Since the degree premium is lower for the associate degree, a student
with a sizable amount of debt has a smaller incentive to finish community college.
The disincentive to complete college outweighs the expansion of college students. As a
result, the total number of college graduates falls under this policy. The plan, however,
has two positive effects on other education outcomes. One is that it reduces the number
of high school dropouts by 5.1%. The other one is that when an individual is enrolled in
college, he spends less time working and takes less time to receive a bachelor’s degree.
7.3 Lifetime Earnings
Income inequality is a serious issue in the US. In particular, the gap in income between
the college educated and those without a college degree has been growing wider. Having
college education has become the prerequisite for joining the middle class. The three
counterfactual experiments all aim at making college more accessible, increase the num-
ber of people with college education and bring down income inequality. It is therefore
important to assess how the distribution of lifetime earnings change under each policy.
Lifetime earnings are calculated as the present value of an individual’s realized annual
income in each period of the simulation. Annual income is the hourly wage times total
hours worked. An individual who is not employed in a period has an annual income of
zero.
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Table 19: Effect of Loan Forgiveness Plan on Education Outcomes and Labor Supply
Baseline Reform Percentage Change
Fraction Enrolled in 2-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.380 0.507 33.4%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.433 0.522 20.5%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.387 0.427 10.3%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.249 0.261 4.8%
Fraction Enrolled in 4-Year Colleges
Family Income Quartile 1 0.311 0.363 16.7%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.409 0.471 15.2%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.539 0.591 9.6%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.742 0.764 3.0%
Fraction In Top 2 College Quality Levels
Family Income Quartile 1 0.400 0.388 -3.0%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.420 0.397 -5.5%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.398 0.374 -6.0%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.596 0.570 -4.4%
Fraction Completed Bachelor’s Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.502 0.344 -31.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.600 0.418 -30.3%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.678 0.548 -19.2%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.837 0.789 -5.7%
Fraction Completed Associate Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 0.238 0.107 -55.0%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.280 0.161 -42.5%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.350 0.200 -42.9%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.409 0.317 -22.5%
Distribution of Education Degree
High School Dropouts 0.158 0.150 -5.1%
High School Graduates 0.439 0.500 13.9%
Associate Degree 0.092 0.066 -28.3%
Bachelor’s Degree 0.311 0.284 -8.7%
Time to Bachelor’s Degree
Family Income Quartile 1 4.789 4.620 -3.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 5.004 4.854 -3.0%
Family Income Quartile 3 4.803 4.658 -3.0%
Family Income Quartile 4 4.782 4.738 -0.9%
Fraction Borrowed Student Loans
by BA Graduation
Family Income Quartile 1 0.814 0.948 16.5%
Family Income Quartile 2 0.791 0.881 11.4%
Family Income Quartile 3 0.660 0.784 18.8%
Family Income Quartile 4 0.440 0.494 12.3%
Average Years Worked by BA Graduation
Family Income Quartile 1 2.892 2.635 -8.9%
Family Income Quartile 2 2.895 2.632 -9.1%
Family Income Quartile 3 2.531 2.283 -9.8%
Family Income Quartile 4 1.989 1.908 -4.1%
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Table 20 summarizes the distribution of lifetime earnings under the baseline as well as
each policy experiment. Both the free community college and the Pay As You Earn plan
increase the average lifetime earnings. This is due to the improved college outcomes as
shown in the previous subsection. The median lifetime earnings under the free commu-
nity college plan is lower compared to the baseline as some individuals substitute away
from 4-year colleges. These individuals were mostly switching from lower quality 4-year
colleges which has more effect on the median level than on the right tail of the distri-
bution. The loan forgiveness plan reduces the mean lifetime earnings mainly because
it gives individuals incentive not to finish their degree as in this case he does not need
to repay his debt. Since less people get the degree premium, overall lifetime earnings
decline.
I also compute three income ratios to measure the income inequality. 90-10 ratio refers
to the ratio between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile of the lifetime earnings.
50-10 ratio calculates the ratio between the 50th percentile and the 10th percentile and
the 90-50 ratio divides the 90th and 50th percentile of the lifetime earnings. 50-10
ratio indicates the income inequality in the lower half of the distribution whereas 90-50
ratio measures the inequality in the upper half of the distribution. Comparing the three
policies we see that the free community college plan achieves the lowest 50-10 ratio while
the Pay As You Earn plan brings down 90-50 ratio the most. This suggests that free
community college plan is more effective in reducing the income inequality for lower
earning individuals. The Pay As You Earn plan, on the other hand, can be used to
lower the income inequality for individuals on the higher end of the distribution.
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Table 20: Distribution of Lifetime Earnings, in Thousands of Dollars
Baseline Free Community College PAYE Loan Forgiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentile
1 443.1 443.3 443.3 443.0
5 530.2 531.5 531.4 531.3
10 629.0 630.5 632.1 630.4
50 1045.2 1037.8 1054.2 1041.3
90 2035.2 2041.3 2042.4 2027.2
Mean 1245.7 1246.8 1251.7 1240.5
Standard Deviation 556.7 560.3 557.3 559.1
90-10 ratio 3.24 3.24 3.23 3.22
50-10 ratio 1.66 1.64 1.67 1.65
90-50 ratio 1.95 1.97 1.93 1.95
7.4 The Fiscal Cost of the Policies
The total fiscal cost of the free community college plan is calculated as the present value
of the total years enrolled in community colleges multiplied by the annual tuition. The
total cost of the Pay As You Earn policy is the present value of the loan balance forgiven
at the end of the 20th repayment period. For the loan forgiveness plan, the total cost is
the present value of the loan amount forgiven for those without any degree (Associate
or Bachelor’s Degree). I show the fiscal cost of each policy as the annual cost per capita
paid over the lifetime in Table 21. The PAYE plan is the cheapest among the three
policies which would cost each individual only 17 dollars each year. The free community
college plan is more expensive compared to the PAYE plan. Compared to the other two
plans, the loan forgiveness is much more costly.
Table 21: Annual Cost Per Capita
Free Community College $62.7
Pay As You Earn $17.0
Loan Forgiveness $153.2
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7.5 Welfare
While the change in lifetime earnings is one measure of the effectiveness of the policy,
ultimately individuals make all their decisions to maximize their utility. Therefore we
should look at the welfare effects of each policy to understand their desirability. To
make all policies comparable in terms of welfare, the tax rate is adjusted under each
policy to ensure a neutral government budget.14 I use an aggregate welfare measure
where each individual is equally weighted. The welfare gain is calculated as the annual
lump-sum transfer to individuals in the baseline such that the utilitarian government
would be indifferent between the new policy and the baseline.15
Table 22 summarizes the welfare effect of the three policies. We can see that all
three policies improve welfare when the fiscal cost is accounted for. Among the policies,
the Pay As You Earn plan leads to the highest welfare gain. There are three factors
contributing to this. The first factor is that, as discussed earlier, this plan achieves
the largest improvement over all college outcomes by increasing college enrollment in
4-year colleges, allowing students to attend better quality colleges, increasing college
completion rate and reducing the time it takes to receive the degree. The second factor
is that this plan is the least costly to the government. Finally, as the education level
is higher, the total tax revenue generated under this policy is higher than that in the
baseline.
14Note that the effects of all polices on college outcomes and lifetime earnings presented here derive
from simulations that do not impose the cost of the policy on individuals. These results are qualitatively
and largely quantitatively unaffected when the costs are imposed through tax changes.
15It is important to note that the timing of the transfer may affect the magnitude of the welfare
gains. This is due to two main reasons. First, individuals are risk averse and their risk aversion differs
across types. Second, in the model capital markets are incomplete and there are borrowing constraints.
Therefore, poor and more risk averse individuals will, for example, gain relatively more from shifting to
an initial one-time lump-sum transfer instead of the transfer given each period. In addition, the same
factors also influence how much an agent values a given transfer.
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The free community college plan gives rise to the second highest welfare gain. There
are several reasons why the welfare gain is lower than that generated from the Pay As
You Earn plan. Despite the fact that many more low-income individuals are now able to
obtain community college education, the number of individuals with a bachelor’s degree
is lower. Moreover, the fiscal cost of this policy is higher as shown before compared to
the Pay As You Earn plan. To finance the fiscal cost, the tax rate needs to be raised.
Since the model features a progressive income taxation schedule, rich individuals bear
more of the tax burden while not benefiting much from the policy as they are mostly
enrolled in 4-year colleges. The loan forgiveness plan only mildly increases the welfare
because it is the most expensive policy to finance and there is little improvement in
education outcomes.
Table 22: Welfare Gains Per Year, in Dollars
Free Community College $12.5
Pay As You Earn $37.3
Loan Forgiveness $2.2
8 Conclusions
The US is falling behind in the college completion rate, ranking 19th out of the 28
OECD countries (OECD (2014)). There is a wide gap in the college enrollment rate and
in the quality of colleges attended across family income levels. The majority of college
students rely on student loan debt to finance college and the real dollar value of student
loan debt is soaring. As a college degree has become a prerequisite to join the middle
class, enhancing education outcomes for individuals, especially those from lower-income
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families, is a crucial way to reduce income inequality and raise average earnings in the
US.
Motivated by these concerns, the Obama government has developed many policy ini-
tiatives. The goal of my paper is to understand the implications of various proposed
or enacted tuition and student loan policies. I build and estimate a structural dynamic
life-cycle model incorporating novel features that are necessary for policy evaluation.
The estimated model addresses two concerns. First, I evaluate the effectiveness of the
policies in improving college outcomes and lifetime earnings. Second, I estimate the
fiscal costs of each policy and assess whether these policies are welfare-improving.
In terms of college outcomes, I find that the free community college plan leads to a
significant increase in the community college enrollment rate for individuals from lower-
income families. The plan, however, has a negative effect on both the four-year college
enrollment and on the completion rate. The Pay As You Earn plan not only increases
college enrollment but also enables students to attend higher quality colleges. The
overall education level in the population increases as the fraction of individuals with a
college degree goes up. The loan forgiveness plan for college dropouts encourages college
enrollment but also discourages students from completing the degree.
All three polices are welfare-improving for a utilitarian government that maintains a
neutral government budget. The Pay As you Earn plan generates the highest welfare
gain and the free community college plan ranks the second. The Pay As You Earn
plan leads to the largest improvement in the quality of the college attended and four-
year college completion rate. It brings down earnings inequality among higher-earning
individuals.16 The free community college plan is the most effective in terms of improving
16Here, earnings inequality refers to the ratio between the 90th and 50th percentile of the lifetime
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college outcomes for lower-income students and reducing earnings inequality in the lower
half of the lifetime earnings distribution.17 The two policies are complementary and
combining elements from each of them could yield an even higher social welfare.
The focus of my paper is on understanding the effects of policies that aim to reduce the
financial cost of attending college, either by providing upfront subsidies, or by reducing
the cost of student loan debt repayment after university. Therefore, I abstract from
channels that might be important for analyzing other aspects of government intervention
in the higher education market. To pick a particular case, recent papers have found that
an important reason as to why low-income and high-achieving individuals do not apply
to higher quality colleges is a lack of information about the available financial aids. For
example, Hoxby, Turner, et al. (2013) find that low-cost government interventions that
provide students with more information lead low-income and high-achieving students
to apply and be admitted to more higher-quality colleges. In my model, the lack of
information for certain groups of individuals is captured by stochastic variations in
preferences. While this is not a first-order concern for the type of reforms I am studying
in the current paper, a comprehensive bundle of educational reforms should also address
the issues linked to information frictions or potential behavioral biases. Studying the
design and effects of such policies in a structural framework is left for future work.
earnings.
17Earnings inequality here refers to the ratio between the 50th and 10th percentile of the lifetime
earnings.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Utility Function
Ut =δs
c
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2∑
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)
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Preference for High School
+
2,4∑
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(µk,qcq + 
k
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+
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µu,k,mec I(SAT = m) + 
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k
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+
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k
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+
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+
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(
µktranI(s
c
t−1 = 1, s
u
t = 1, t > 2)
)
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Psychic Cost of Schooling (< 0)
where δs = 1 if an individual is not enrolled in college, δs = δs1 if s
u
t = 1, and δs =
δs2 if s
c
t = 1. αk is the constant relative risk aversion parameter which differs by
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the unobserved type. Including the unobserved type in the utility function allows for
permanent unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for work and college choices. All the
shocks are assumed to follow a normal distribution: (i) khs ∼ N(0, (σkhs)2), k = {1, 2},
(ii) kcq ∼ N(0, (σkcq)2), k = {1, 2}, (iii) i,kec ∼ N(0, (σi,kec )2), i = {u, c}, k = {1, 2}, (iv)
k
wi
∼ N(0, (σk
wi
)2), i = {1, 2}, k = {1, 2}.
9.2 Parameter Estimates
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Table 23: Parameter Estimates
Utility
µ1w κ
1
w λ
1
6 λ
1
7 µ
2
w κ
2
w λ
2
6 λ
2
7
-0.0800 3.0000 0.0100 0.0100 -0.0126 2.8096 0.0000 5.97E-6
(0.00005) (0.0203) (0.0003) (0.0010) (2.07E-7) (0.0021) (4.31E-6) (6.47E-7)
µu,1mv µ
c,1
mv µ1tran λ
1
8 λ
1
9 µ
u,2
mv µ
c,2
mv µ2tran
-0.3380 -0.1921 -0.2500 -0.0300 -0.0200 -0.0400 -0.0005 -0.0000
(0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0015) (8.55E-5) (0.0001) (0.0002) (3.15E-5) (1.52E-5)
λ28 λ
2
9 δs1 δs2 c
1,1
App c
2,1
App c
1,1
App c
2,1
App
-0.0009 -0.0005 0.60000 0.8000 0.0622 0.0058 0.0025 0.0015
(3.50E-6) (7.95E-6) (9.93E-5) (0.0002) (0.0007) (2.23E-5) (0.0011) (3.23E-5)
µ1hs µ
2
hs
-0.9700 0.4643
(0.0126) (0.0042)
Family Transfer
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ
1
4 γ
2
4 γ
3
4 γ
4
4 γ5
1.0510 0.0164 1.0000 0.0750 0.0750 0.1000 0.1300 0.5000
(0.0104) (3.69E-6) (0.0030) (5.73E-5) (5.63E-5) (5.10E-5) (4.76E-5) (0.0062)
γ6 γ7 γ8 γ
1
9 γ
2
9 γ10
0.0300 0.0150 -0.0120 0.8500 0.5000 -0.1300
(7.5E-5) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0020)
Net Cost of Attendance
µ1,1Q1 µ
1,1
Q2
µ1,1Q3 µ
1,1
Q4
µ1,2Q1 µ
1,2
Q2
µ1,2Q3 µ
1,2
Q4
2.6188 2.7700 2.8500 3.1211 -0.0000 -0.0266 -0.0902 -0.0000
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0020)
µ1,3Q1 µ
1,3
Q2
µ1,3Q3 µ
1,3
Q4
µ1,1Q5 µ
2
Q1
µ2Q2 µ
2
Q3
-0.0266 -0.1000 -0.2000 -0.3000 2.5147 0.0006 0.0000 0.0010
(0.0086) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0010) (6.07E-5) (4.45E-7) (3.41E-7) (3.67E-7)
µ2Q4
0.0005
(3.32E-7)
Admissions Probabilities
g0,1Adm,1 g
0,1
Adm,2 g
0,1
Adm,3 g
0,1
Adm,4 g
0,2
Adm,1 g
0,2
Adm,2 g
0,2
Adm,3 g
0,2
Adm,4
0.9803 1.0000 0.8200 -1.6203 0.8000 0.4355 0.7000 -2.2000
(0.0438) (0.0282) (0.0379) (0.0219) (0.0064) (0.0104) (0.0178) (0.0142)
g1Adm,1 g
1
Adm,2 g
1
Adm,3 g
1
Adm,4 g
2
Adm,1 g
2
Adm,2 g
2
Adm,3 g
2
Adm,4
0.4000 0.4000 0.2012 2.1944 0.4000 0.7000 0.4668 3.0000
(0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0278) (0.0707) (0.0463) (0.0177) (0.0279) (0.0246)
Accumulation of Experience
χ0HD χ
1
HD χ
2
HD χ
u
s χ
c
s
0.3000 0.7000 0.8000 0.5000 0.7000
(0.0004) (8.52E-5) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0014)
69
Table 24: Parameter Estimates, Continued
Type Distribution
pi0 pi1 pi2 pi3
1.6000 -0.0178 -0.3000 -0.2000
(0.0030) (3.53E-6) (0.0050) (0.0114)
Shocks
σ1hs σ
2
hs σ
1
cq σ
2
cq σ
1
w1 σ
1
w2 σ
2
w1 σ
2
w2
0.0232 0.0148 0.2500 0.0300 0.1800 0.1736 0.0030 0.0007
(0.0230) (0.0029) (0.0013) (3.68E-5) (0.0010) (0.0004) (1.05E-5) (4.40E-6)
σu,1ec σ
c,1
ec σ
u,2
ec σ
c,2
ec σ z z¯ zp
0.2500 0.1250 0.0125 0.0180 0.2000 0.7989 1.1989 0.9500
(0.0003) (0.0004) (3.30E-6) (3.03E-6) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0001)
σQ1 σQ2 σQ3 σQ4 σQ5 σtr
0.0314 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 2.0000
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0025)
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